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11. Overview1
Standard theories of scope are semantically blind. They employ a single logico-syntactic rule of 
scope assignment (quantifying in, Quantifier Raising, storage, or type change, etc.) which 
roughly speaking "prefixes" an expression a  to a domain D and thereby assigns scope to it over 
D, irrespective of what a  means, and irrespective of what operator ß  may occur in D:
( 1) The semantically blind rule of scope assignment:
a  [D ... ß ...] =  >  a  scopes over ß
There are two basic ways in which (1) turns out to be incorrect: the resulting interpretation may 
be incoherent, or the resulting interpretation may be coherent but not available for the string it 
is assigned to.
Szabolcsi & Zwarts (1993) focus on the first case. Take a version of (1) that is assumed 
to operate in surface syntax: WH-fronting. In a sizable class o f cases, called "weak island viola-
tions, " this rule
(2) a. Who
b. Who
c. Who
(3) a. How
b.* How
c.* How
(4) a. Who
b.* Who
c.* Who
1 This paper develops ideas in Szabolcsi (1993; 1994a, Section 4; 1994b) and has been 
presented at talks and in class in Budapest, at MIT, and at UCLA. I am grateful to Michael 
Brody, Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin, Donka Farkas, Irene Heim, László Kálmán and, most of all, 
Dórit Ben-Shalom for discussion. This research was partially supported by NSF grant # SBR 
9222501.
2Sz&Z submit that the violation is semantic in nature. How in (3b,c) and who in (4b,c) ought to 
scope over domains D that they are unable to. The reason is that manners and collectives are 
elements of proper join semi-lattices. Sz&Z argue that the computation o f the denotation of a 
factive context requires taking meets, and that of the negative context, complements. Since these 
operations are not defined in join semi-lattices, manners and collectives cannot scope over such 
contexts. For the moment, let it suffice that the a > ß  scope relation, pace (1), is not seman­
tically unconstrained.
To illustrate the second case, which the present paper is concerned with, consider the 
fact that quantifiers in English often scope over operators that are higher in the surface syntactic 
hierarchy. These cases are attributed to the covert operation of (1). This account predicts, 
however, that all quantifiers a  interact uniformly with all operators ß. But they do not. E .g., 
some but not all direct objects can scope over the subject (5), and some but not all can scope 
over negation (6):
(5) a. Three referees read every abstract, 
’every N >  three N ’
b. Three referees read few abstracts. 
* ’few N >  two N ’
(6) a. John didn’t read many abstracts, 
’many N >  not’
b. John didn’t read few abstracts.
* ’few N >  not’
It turns out that these contrasts have to do with semantics, too; however, they pertain to the syn- 
tax/semantics interface, rather than pure semantics. That is, the starred examples are not 
incoherent; simply, the given form cannot carry the intended meaning. Proof is that the same 
a ’s are able to scope over the same /3’s in English when they are originally higher in syntactic 
structure (7) or when they acquire such a higher position via overt fronting (8):
(7) a. Few referees read three abstracts.
’few N >  three N ’ 
b. Few women didn’t like John.
’few N >  not’
(8) Few men did no one / every woman / two women like.
’few N >  no N / every N / two N ’
Examples comparable to (8) are standard in Hungarian, a language that disambiguates scope in 
surface structure (see below).
I do not find it desirable to develop a theory that maintains the omnivorous rule (1) and 
supplements it with a variety of filters on its overt or covert application. Such a strategy would
3simply not be explanatory. Instead, I argue for an approach that is as constructive as possible. 
(This constructive methology is in the same spirit as the combinatory categorial approach to 
syntax in Szabolcsi (1992) and references cited therein, although the results to be discussed in 
this chapter are entirely independent of categorial grammar.)
The assumption is that "quantification" involves a variety o f distinct, semantically 
conditioned processes. Each kind of expression participates in those processes that suit its 
particular semantic properties. Thus the heuristic principle is this:
(9) What range of quantifiers actually participates in a given process is suggestive of
exactly what that process consists in.
Based on data in Liu (1990, 1992), proposals how to devise semantically conditioned specialized 
scopal mechanisms were first made in Ben-Shalom (1993) and Beghelli (1993). A both 
empirically and theoretically more fully developed version of the latter is Stowell & Beghelli 
(1994, in progress).
In this paper I first summarize those features of Ben-Shalom’s proposal that will be 
important in the core discussion. Then I proceed to reviewing certain aspects of S&B’s theory 
(various other aspects are taken up in Beghelli (1995)) and suggest that data from Hungarian, 
a language that "wears its LF on its sleeve," provide specific empirical support for them. Then 
I propose that S&B’s LF, especially in the light of some of the Hungarian data, can be quite 
directly mapped onto (somewhat modified) Kamp & Reyle (1993) style Discourse Representa­
tions.2
The aspects of DRT that seem to correlate quite interestingly with these findings are 
(i) the assumption that noun phrases either introduce a discourse referent or operate in the 
manner of generalized quantifiers, and (ii) the assumption that a discourse referent can be 
dissociated from the distributive operator (when there is one) that it is the key argument of. On 
the other hand, the observations in S&B help eliminate a certain indeterminacy in DRS 
construction rules, especially with respect to the order in which noun phrases are to be processed 
(the issue of inverse scope) and with respect to the possible locations o f distributive operators.
The main modification of DRT that S&B’s theory of English as well as my own data 
from Hungarian call for pertains to the treatment of quantifiers like every man and some others. 
I will argue that these also introduce a discourse referent, albeit a somewhat different kind than 
the type two men. In this light, I propose two modes of operation for noun phrases: (a) introduce
2 Potentially, other dynamic theories could be used, too. K&R’s is special in that it happens 
to include significant work on plurals, as opposed to Heim’s (1982) File Change semantics. The 
intuition my analysis is based on relies on the representational character of DRT; it remains to 
be seen whether DPL-style reincarnations of DRT would be equally suited to this purpose.
4a discourse referent (corresponding to a witness set of the generalized quantifier) as a logical 
subject o f  distributive or collective predication, or (b) operate on a predicate denotation in the 
manner o f a counting quantifier. I call these "modes of operation" because the distinction seems 
to pertain essentially to canonical verification procedures, although it does have a representation­
al correlate. Hungarian shows that the denotational semantics o f the noun phrase delimits, but 
does not fully determine, its procedural options.
I remark that these two modes of operation are reminiscent of the "look-up" versus 
"compute" distinction made in Szabolcsi & Zwarts (1993). Developing a broader procedural 
theory that properly subsumes both goes beyond the scope o f this paper, however.
'L Constructive approaches to differential scope taking 
2.1 Ben-Shalom (19931
Ben-Shalom restricts her attention to a representative subset o f the data in Liu (1990) that do not 
involve partitives. Some features of her proposal that are directly relevant to the present paper 
are as follows. Consider (10) and (11):
(10) Three referees read every abstract.
(11) Three referees read fewer than five abstracts.
The standard way to calculate the object wide scope (0 > S )  reading of (10) is to form the set 
of things read by three referees and check whether every abstract is in that set. But if the 
formation o f  this set, which is not the denotation of a surface syntactic constituent of the 
sentence, is a freely available option, then it can be used in calculating an 0 > S  reading for
(11) , too. This is the standard assumption in the literature. However, (11) does not readily admit 
an 0 > S  reading. This suggests that the 0 > S  reading of (10) is not calculated in the above 
mentioned way, either. Rather, it must be calculated in some alternative way that is available 
when the intended wide scope quantifier is, say, every man but not when it is, say, fewer than 
five abstracts.
Ben-Shalom proposes that inverse scope is effected by a specific binary quantifier
[0>S].
(12) If S and O are generalized quantifiers and R is the relation denoted by a transitive verb, 
the binary quantifier [O >  S] is defined to operate as follows:
For every a 6  A , S(R(a)),
where A is some set determined by O.
5\x[S(R(x))] is the property denoted by the subjects-verb segment of the sentence; in the 
examples at hand, it is the property of being read by three referees, cf. Xx[XP33y[referee(y) & 
P(y)](read(x))]. Informally, (12) says, "Grab a set A determined by the quantifier denoted by 
the object and check, for every element a of this set, whether it has the property that three 
referees read it." (The fact that Ben-Shalom formulates her proposal using a binary quantifier 
is immaterial for the present paper, so it will not be dwelt on.)
Let us underline the procedural difference between the standard calculation of scope and 
the one encoded by [O > S]. The difference is twofold. On the standard account we construct the 
set denoted by Xx[S(R(x))] and let O operate on it. Using [0 > S ] , this set does not need to be 
constructed and O is not a predicate operator. Instead, O contributes a domain of entitites, each 
of which is checked for the property Xx[S(R(x))].3
The binary quantifier [O >  S] works most straightforwardly when O is a principal filter, 
because principal filters are precisely those quantifiers that determine a unique set, called their 
generator. The unique set If every man ] determines is the set of men; the unique set II John and 
B ill] determines is the set (john, bill}, etc. When O is just monotone increasing, it determines 
several suitable sets (in a big enough model), called its witnesses, so the operation of [0 >S ]  
is less simple but still perfectly viable. But when O is monotone decreasing or non-monotonic, 
it does not determine any suitable set on its own. As is explained in detail in Chapter 1, the truth 
conditions of Fewer than six men walk or Exactly six men walk cannot be specified as "There 
is a set A consisting of fewer than/exactly six men such that each aE A  walk." Hence [0 > S ]  
is inapplicable to non-increasing quantifiers.
According to Ben-Shalom, [O > S] captures the empirical facts correctly because the best 
inverse scope takers in English are indeed principal filters. In the discussion below I will 
consider a wider range of quantifiers in a wider range of contexts, and propose a somewhat 
similar account of them, exploiting the fact that the strategy "Grab a witness set and check its 
elements for property P" generalizes exactly to the increasing quantifiers.
The discussion of Stowell & Beghelli’s proposal will make clear that, however insightful 
Ben-Shalom’s proposal is, the overall picture of scope interaction is more complex than Liu’s 
pioneering work suggested. Two important factors are (i) the need to factor out the contribution 
of distributivity and (ii) the fact that the possibility of inverse scope depends, not only on the 
choice of the wide scope taker but, sometimes, also on the choice of the narrow scope taker. 
Thus the account requires a more complex set of assumptions.
3 It might be objected that checking whether an entity has property Xx[S(R(x))] involves 
checking whether it is in the corresponding set, but this is not really so. To use a mathematical 
example, we may not be able to construct the set of prime numbers, but we may well be able 
to determine whether a given number is a prime, by examining what its divisors are. This 
example also reveals that the checking procedure may be intensional and/or invoke inferential 
processes. I thank Ed Keenan for discussion on this issue.
62.2 Stowell & Beghelli (1994. in progress')
Like Ben-Shalom, Stowell & Beghelli dispense with Quantifier Raising, an omnivorous 
movement rule without a specific landing site, and propose that Logical Form in English 
includes, among others, the following hierarchy of functional projections. (I am not presenting 
the full justification of this structure below.)
(13) Referential Phrase (RefP)
Each type o f quantifier acquires its scope by moving into the specifier of that functional category 
which suits its semantic and/or morphological properties. Some important options are as follows.
Definites (the two men I move to RefP and distributive universals (every man) to DistP. 
The head o f DistP selects for a ShareP complement, which can be either an indefinite (two (of 
the) men) or an existential quantifier over events. Indefinites may alternatively move to RefP.
Modified numerals (more than six men, fewer than six men, exactly six men, and 
indefinites whose noun is destressed) do not move to either RefP, DistP, or ShareP. They just 
move to the appropriate agreement position to receive Case. The fact that modified numeral 
subjects are capable of taking widest scope follows from the fact that AgrSP in English happens 
to be higher than DistP and ShareP (plus a fact about distributivity to be mentioned below). On 
the other hand, indirect and direct object modified numerals happen to have their agreement 
positions quite low in the structure, and they scope accordingly.4
The possibility of inverse scope is due to reconstruction. The simplest assumption is that
4 Definites, universals, and bare indefinites also pass through or land in their own agreement 
positions for Case reasons and this may affect their distributivity.
Spec Subject Agreement Phrase (AgrSP)
Spec Distributive Phrase (DistP)
Spec Distr. Share Phrase (ShareP)
Spec Negative Phrase (NegP)
Spec Ind. Object Agreement Phrase (AgrIOP)
Spec Dir. Object Agr. Phrase (AgrOP)
Spec Verb Phrase (VP)
7(i) reconstruction can only undo semantically insignificant movement, i.e. modified numerals can 
be lowered from their Case position but expressions in RefP, DistP, or ShareP cannot be 
lowered; and (ii) a phrase can be reconstructed into the position(s) o f its trace, typically, into 
its VP-intemal position. For instance,
(14) a. More than three men read every book
b. [Agrsp more than three men! [DistP every book ... [VP ... tj ...]]]
----------------------------------------------------------------1
The converse is not possible: Every man read more than three books does not receive an inverse 
scope interpretation since every man cannot undo its presence in DistP and reconstruct into a 
VP-intemal position below AgrOP:
(15) a. Every man read more than three books
b. Lgrsp every man! [DistP [ ^ p  3e L ^p more than three books [VP . ..  tx ...]]]]]
------------------------------ /-----------------------------------1
There is a slight difference between (15) and More than three men read more than six books. 
Here inverse scope is also very difficult but can be forced by context. Since more than three 
man as a subject can in general reconstruct into its VP-intemal position, this is in fact predicted. 
(Then the marginality of reconstruction when the object is also a modified numeral calls for an 
independent account.)
Definites and bare indefinites do not move to DistP even when they are interpreted 
distributively; instead, their distributive interpretation is due to a silent operator comparable to 
adverbial (not "binominal") each. S&B call this "pseudo-distributivity." Silent each can 
apparently occur below AgrSP, ShareP, AgrIOP, and AgrOP, but not below RefP. This captures 
the fact that even when direct object three books moves to RefP and is therefore referentially 
independent of subject two of the men, it cannot make the latter referentially dependent, since 
there is no distributive operator between the two positions.
(16) a. Two of the men men read three books
b. [RdP three books Lgrsp two of the meni [SharcP f  [... ]]]]
On the other hand, in the structure below the property of having read three of the books can be 
distributed over two men, because the latter has a trace in AgrSP associated with silent each:
(17) a. Two men read three of the books
b. [RefP two meni [ ^ p  f  EACH [sharcP three of the books [ . . . .  ]]]]
8We have seen that the distributivity o f  universal is due to a separate distributive operator 
(Dist) and, similary, the distributivity of definites and bare indefinites is due to a separate 
distributive operator (silent each). This is important because once the distributive key and the 
distributive operator are separated, they can move separately. This possibility is made crucial 
use of. Every man and (the) two men are allowed to move upward unboundedly to a higher 
RefP, but the corresponding distributive operators, being heads or adverbs, stay put. Thus it is 
predicted that (18) has a de re reading where every woman or two particular women have the 
property of there being more than six men who think that the women will fall in love with them; 
but the men cannot vary with the women, as this property does not distribute:
(18) More than six men imagine that every woman / two women will fall in love with them.
The fact that the distributive operators do not move up to the next clause is what explains the 
traditional observation that "QR is clause bounded."
3  ^ Claims to be made
Below I will examine Hungarian data in the light of S&B and make the following main claims:
(19) Hungarian distinguishes scope positions in its surface syntax that are highly reminiscent 
of those postulated by Stowell & Beghelli for Logical Form in English.
(20) Some noun phrases can occur in only one of the above scope positions, but others can 
occur in more than one, and their interpretations vary accordingly.
(21) It is known that the presuppositional versus existential interpretation of noun phrases may 
be a function of their position. Hungarian is shown to exhibit similar positional 
distinctions in a new dimension, distributivity.
(22) Scope taking mechanisms fall into two broad categories. In the one case, the noun phrase 
introduces a logical subject of predication; in the other, it performs a counting operation 
on an independently defined predicate denotation.
(23) The above distinction is not a purely denotational one, instead, it is representational/ 
procedural. The original basic insight o f DRT seems convenient for capturing the 
distinction (technically or at least metaphorically). Introducing a logical subject of 
predication can be assimilated to introducing a discourse referent. Anaphora facts will 
motivate the distinction o f  two kinds o f discourse referents: individuals (atomic or plural) 
and sets.
(24) In general, the logical forms S&B derive for English sentences can be seen as direct 
instructions for constructing DRSs.
94.1 Hungarian surface structure disambiguates scope
Hungarian has come to be known as a language that "wears its LF on its sleeve." A substantial 
body of work by Hunyadi, Kenesei, É.Kiss, Szabolcsi, and others since the early Eighties has 
established that surface order and intonation disambiguate scope. For instance, the following 
sentences are unambiguous; the scopal order of quantifiers matches their left-to-right order.5
(25) a.
b.
(26) a.
b.
Sok ember mindenkit felhívott, 
many man everyone-acc up-called 
’Many men phoned everyone’
Mindenkit sok ember felhívott, 
everyone-acc many man up-called 
’Many men phoned everyone’
Hatnál több ember hívott fel mindenkit, 
six-than more man called up everyone-acc 
’More than six men phoned everyone’ 
Mindenkit hatnál több ember hívott fel 
everyone-acc six-than more man called up 
’More than six men phoned everyone’
many men >  everyone
everyone >  many men
more than 6 men >  everyone
everyone >  more than 6 men
Theoretically speaking, it is the occurrence in specific syntactic positions that defines the 
quantifiers’ scope. Simple syntactic tests distinguish the positions in (27), which I label with the 
pretheoretical names that have by now become more or less traditional; I coined the speaking 
name Predicate Operator for one subtype of what is traditionally called Focus. As usual, the * 
indicates that the given position may be filled multiply:6
5 For simplicity’s sake, in this paper I will only consider cases in which the postverbal 
universal is unstressed. It is agreed, following É. Kiss (1987), that the alternative, heavy stressed 
option involves stylistic postposing in Phonetic Form.
6 Topics are flatly intoned and not contrastive; contrastive topics (paraphrasable by ’as for 
. . . ’) have a scooped intonation, must be followed by some operator, and are analyzed by Kiss 
(1987) as instances of Left Dislocation. In this paper I am not concerned with Left Dislocation, 
so even the position is omitted from the diagram.
10
The fact that left-to-right order determines scopal order follows from (28). For recent 
discussions, see É.Kiss (1991, 1994).
(28) In Hungarian, operators c-command their scope at S-structure (where c-command is 
defined in terms of first branching node).
Typically, a Hungarian sentence with n scope-bearing DPs will have n or m l in the preverbal 
field, so that their scopes are indeed disambiguated by surface order. The postverbal field is 
assumed to have a flat structure. It is rare but possible to have more than one scope-bearing DP 
postverbally; what their relative interpretation is is an interesting question which I will return 
to in the Appendix but which need not concern us in the bulk o f the paper.
Some of the diagnostics o f which position a DP occupies in the preverbal field are as 
follows:
(29) a. Topics, but not Quantifiers, can be followed by sentential adverbial like tegnap
’yesterday.’
b. When a Quantifier precedes a non-negated finite verb that has a prefix, the prefix 
is in its proclitic position.
c. When a Focus or Predicate Operator precedes a non-negated finite verb that has 
a prefix, the prefix occurs postverbally. 7
d. A sequence of Quantifiers cannot be broken by a non-Quantifier.
e. A DP in Focus receives an exclusion-by-identification interpretation; a DP in 
Predicate Operator does not. (See Szabolcsi 1994b for some discussion.)
7 That is to say, the finite V moves into the head of the functional projection whose specifier 
position Focus or Predicate Operator occupies.
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4.2 A parallelism with S&B’s LF
I argue that the extent to which Hungarian surface structure reveals the syntax of scope is even 
greater than has been thought. Namely, the traditionally distinguished positions correspond quite 
closely to the specifier positions of the functional categories in (13). For the time being, I ignore 
the postverbal field.
(30) Hungarian Topic
Quantifier
Focus (with indefs.) 
Predicate Operator
Spec, RefP 
Spec, DistP 
Spec, ShareP 
Spec, AgrP/VP
This parallelism is supported by data that pertain to (i) exactly what noun phrases occur in each 
position, and (ii) what kind of interpretation they receive there.
Some restrictions on the occurrence of DPs in these positions are well-known. E.g. a 
Topic must be specific, and universals do not occur in Topic or Focus (this latter fact was first 
observed in Szabolcsi 1980:66). However, no systematic investigation of these matters has been 
carried out to date. In what follows I examine a representative sample. Note that many DPs 
occur in more than one position; as we shall see, their interpretations vary accordingly.
Let us see how the mere distribution of DPs supports the parallelism in (30).
Proper names, definites, and those indefinites that take widest scope in their own clause 
are placed into [Spec, RefP] in S&B. The Hungarian counterparts occur in Topic.
Distributive universals are placed into [Spec, DistP] in S&B. The Hungarian counterparts 
occur in Quantifier position.
Bare indefinites that scope under distributive universals are placed into [Spec, ShareP] in 
S&B. The Hungarian counterparts can occur in Focus with a comparable scope interpretation.
Modified numerals, which do not readily take inverse scope in English are placed into 
[Spec, AgrP] or [Spec, VP] in S&B. The same holds for indefinites whose N  is destressed and 
whose numeral is interpreted as ’exactly n .’ The (relevant) Hungarian counterparts cannot occur 
higher than the Predicate Operator position.8
In view of the above data as well as in anticipation of the discussion below, it seems 
justified to refer at least to Hungarian Topic as (spec of) HRefP and Hungarian Quantifier as 
(spec of) HDistP. On the other hand, I will retain the labels Focus and PredOp since here, it 
seems, the pertinent similarities are functional and the residual differences are significant. 
(ShareP, unlike Focus, does not host definites; PredOp, unlike AgrP, is not Case-related, etc.)
8 That is, unless a constituent of DP is set into contrast, in which case the whole DP is pied 
piped to Focus. This option is irrelevant to us and is not indicated in the table.
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(31) Topic Quantifier Focus PredOp Post-V
a legtöbb fiú 4- +
’most (of the) boys’
valamely fiúíbizonyos fiúk 4- +
’some boy(s)’
Péter, Péter és Mária + + +
’Peter,’ ’P and M’
a fiú(k) 4- + +
’the boy(s)’ ’
hat fiú 4- + +@ +
’six boys’
sok fiú 4- + + @ +
’many boys’
minden fiú + 4-
’every boy’
valamennyi fiú + +
’each boy’
még Péter is 4- 4-
’even Peter’
hat fiú is + 4-
’even/as many as six boys’
Péter is + +
’Peter, too’
semelyik fiú (neg. concord) + 4-
’none of the boys’
legalább hat fiú + +
’at least six boys.’
több, mint hat fiú + + +
’more than six boys(l)’
hatnál több fiú + + ti
’more than six boys(2)’
pontosan hat fiú 4- + ti
’exactly six boys’
kevés fiú + + ti
’few boys’
kevesebb, mint hat fiú 4- + ti
hatnál kevesebb fiú + + ti
’less than six boys(l,2)’
legfeljebb hat fiú + + ti
’at most six boys’
fiú(k) + + ti
’boy(s), existential’
@ With noun destressed
ti Only if PredOp/Focus is filled or V is negated
13
Apart from the fact that scopal movement is visible, the crucial point where Hungarian 
differs from English is that Hungarian has no agreement (Case) positions mixed with the scope 
positions in the preverbal field, whence scope relations are independent of the argument 
hierarchy. In the Appendix to this paper I sketch out a theoretical syntactic analysis o f Hungarian 
sentence structure that captures the observations above.
5i Distributivitv
The reason why the Quantifier position deserves the label HDistP is that all DPs occurring there 
are strictly distributive. (Although we get distributive readings elsewhere, too, as will be 
discussed below.)
Some DPs occur only in HDistP and not in the other three distinguished positions. 
Universals, minden fiú ’every boy’ and valamennyi fiú ’each boy’ are the paradigmatic cases. 
But all is ’also, even’ phrases are like universals in that they are barred from HRefP, Focus and 
PredOp. For their distributivity, consider:
(32) Kati is fel-emelte az asztalt.
Kati also up-lifted the table-acc 
’Kati lifted up the table, too’
This sentence cannot mean that along with others, Kati was a member o f a collective that lifted 
up the table. It can only mean that Kati lifted the table on her own, and someone else did too.
(33) Hat fiú is fel-emelte az asztalt.
six boy even up-lifted the table-acc 
’As many as six boys lifted up the table’
Here the contribution of is ’even’ is essentially scalar: hat ... is means that six is considered 
many. Nevertheless, while the same sentence without is may well have a collective reading, the 
sentence may only mean that there were as many as six individual table liftings.
But the most interesting new facts involve the observation that the same noun phrase may 
sometimes occur in more than one position, and its interpretation varies accordingly. The most 
tangible differences arise in contexts that distinguish distributive and collective interpretations.
Consider first telic predicates that can be either distributive or collective. Names, 
definites and bare indefinites (=D P s that can occur both in HRefP and in Focus) support either 
reading, in HRefP as well as in Focus. DPs in HDistP do not support a collective reading at all. 
Finally, DPs in PredOp support an unmarked distributive reading of the sentence as well as a
14
marked collective one, which has the flavor "It took as many/few as n boys to VP."
In the examples below the first DP is one that occurs only in the given position and the 
second is one that occurs in different positions with varying interpretations.
(34) a. Kati és Mari HRefP 
Két fiú fel-emelte az asztalt.
’Kati and Mari
Two boys lifted up the table’ 
ok lifting: collective
b. Minden fiú HDistP 
Több, mint hat fiú fel-emelte az asztalt.
’Every boy
More than six boys lifted up the table’
* lifting: collective
c. Kevesebb, mint hat fiú PredOp 
Több, mint hat fiú emelte fel az asztalt.
’Less than six boys
More than six boys lifted up the table’ 
ok lifting: "it took n"-collective
Similar results are obtained with purely non-distributive telic predicates: "once only" 
predicates. Notice that here the distributive interpretation is out, no matter what the subject is: 
the same sand castle cannot be destroyed more than once (I mark this with ft). See Szabolcsi & 
Zwarts (1993: Section 5) for a discussion.
(35) a. Kati és Mari le-rombolta a homokvárat. HRefP 
’Kati and Mari tore down the sand castle’ 
ok destruction: collective 
ft destruction: distributive
b.ft Minden fiú HDistP
Több, mint hat fiú le-rombolta a homokvárat.
’Every boy
More than six boys tore down the sand castle’ 
* destruction: collective 
ft destruction: distributive
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c. Kevesebb, mint hat fiú PredOp
Több, mint hat fiú rombolta le a homokvárat.
’Less than six boys
More than six boys tore down the sand castle’ 
ok destruction: "it took n"-collective
# destruction: distributive
On the other hand, there are other non-distributive predicates like surround where even 
the "it took n" flavor is absent, and modified numerals in PredOP support an impeccable 
collective interpretation of the sentence. I suspect that this difference, which otherwise plays no 
role in my analysis and will not be investigated further, is due to the stativity o f the predicate. 
(Note that surround differs from gather, for instance, in that (i) if a plurality of entities surround 
something together, then no subset of them surrounds it, but (ii) a single entity may surround 
something by forming a full circle on its own.)
(36) a. Az X birtok és az Y birtok körül-öleli a kastélyt. HRefP
’Estate X and estate Y surround the castle’ 
ok surrounding: collective
ok surrounding: concentric circles
b. Minden birtok HDistP
Több, mint hat birtok
Sok birtok körül-öleli a kastélyt.
’Every estate 
More than six estates
Many estates surround the castle’
* surrounding: collective
ok surrounding: concentric circles
c. Kevesebb, mint hat birtok PredOp
Több, mint hat birtok
Sok birtok öleli körül a kastélyt.
’Less than six estates 
More than six estates
Many estates surround the castle’
ok surrounding: collective
ok surrounding: concentric circles
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The behavior o f DPs in Quantifier position fully supports the idea that this position is 
analogous to [Spec, DistP]. Not only do the Hungarian counterparts of every boy and each boy 
occur in this position, but a variety o f further DPs do, too. And while the latter can support 
collective readings elsewhere, in this position they only support distributive readings.
However, the following question presents itself: Do the collective or distributive readings 
arise in the same manner in all three positions?
(L. Outline of the analysis
In the foregoing discussion I was careful to use a wording according to which a DP "supports 
a collective/distributive reading of the sentence." The reason is that I wished to remain entirely 
neutral as to what role this DP specifically plays in the formation of such a reading. I will argue 
that in every one of the three positions that we are considering the DPs play a somewhat 
different role. The claims are as follows. I formulate them with respect to Hungarian and will 
argue for them using Hungarian data, but recall that I believe that, modulo the obvious cross- 
linguistic differences, these data are supportive of S&B’s approach and, therefore, my claims 
are intended to hold of their logical forms, too. In fact, some of these claims are incorporated 
into Stowell & Beghelli (in progress) .9
(37) A DP that occurs both in HRefP and Focus, as well as valamelv/bizonyos N ’some N (s)’ 
that only occur in HRefP, contribute an individual to the interpretation of the sentence, 
i . e . , an atomic or a plural individual (the atoms of) which correspond(s) to the element(s) 
o f  a witness set o f the DP .10 This individual serves as a logical subject o f predication. 
Predication may be distributive or collective, depending on the nature o f the predicate.
(38) A DP in HDistP contributes a set to the interpretation o f the sentence, i .e . , a witness set. 
This set serves as a logical subject o f predication mediated by a distributive operator.
(39) A DP in PredOp does not contribute an entity to the interpretation of the sentence and 
does not serve as a logical subject of predication. It is a counting operator on the
9 A legtöbb fiú ’most (of the) boys’ and fiúik) ’boy(s), existential’ are not included in my 
three categories. Their analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper.
10 A witness set of a generalized quantifier GQ is a set that is (i) an element o f GQ, and (ii) 
a subset o f  the smallest set GQ lives on. E.g. a witness set o f Í two men 1 is a set consisting of 
two men. See Chapter 1 for discussion.
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property denoted by the rest of the sentence. If that predicate is distributive and thus 
denotes a set, the DP counts its elements. If that predicate is collective and thus denotes 
a plural individual, the DP counts its atoms. The result of counting may even be 
compared to the cardinality of the NP-set, i.e. the DP’s determiner need not be 
intersec tive.
The basic distinction that I wish to make is between DP denotations that contribute an 
entity as a target of predication and DP denotations that operate on the denotation of the 
predicate in the manner of generalized quantifiers. Such a distinction seems straightforward 
between names, definites and bare indefinites on the one hand and modified numerals on the 
other.11 Distributive quantifiers might seem to side naturally with the latter group, but I claim 
they indeed side with the former. The above reviewed facts concerning distributive versus 
collective interpretations follow from this two-fold distinction, I argue. But, as we shall see, 
anaphora facts require finer tuning, so distributive quantifiers end up as a separate subspecies 
in the predicational category. This is what the proposals in (37) through (39) attempt to capture.
It seems to me that a natural framework for expressing these proposals is a version of 
the Discourse Representation Theory expounded in Kamp & Reyle (1993). The claim that some 
DPs serve as logical subjects of predication should translate as the claim that they introduce 
discourse referents. Following K&R (1993:168), by "introduces a discourse referent" I mean that 
the rule processing the DP introduces a referent either into the universe o f the very DRS to 
which it is applied or into the universe of a superordinate DRS. This contrasts with rules that 
take care of quantifiers; these place a discourse referent into a newly created subordinate DRS.
I understand that K&R stipulate that when a DP "introduces a discourse referent" then, 
at the point of introduction, it is associated with all and only the conditions that come from 
material inside the DP. That is, even if a referent is introduced into a superordinate DRS, it will 
never be divorced from its DP-intemal conditions; this in fact takes care of a problem discussed 
in Abusch (1994).12 1 take it that if certain discourse referents are formed e.g. via abstraction, 
they do not count as "discourse referents introduced by a DP" and cannot be placed into
11 The claim that HRefP serves as a logical subject of predication squares entirely with 
Kiss’s (1992, 1994) analysis of Hungarian, although she makes no comparable claims about the 
other positions.
12 The example comes from Heim (1982): If a cat likes a friend o f mine. I always give it 
to him. On the intended interpretation, a friend of mine is to be construed as having wide scope. 
But if only existential closure is outside the conditional and the predicate friend o f mine is in the 
antecedent, the sentence will be incorrectly verified by a model where there is someone who is 
not a friend of mine. Abusch (1994) proposes a specific syntactic mechanism to percolate the 
predicate up to the quantifier.
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superordinate DRSs, either.13
These qualifications in fact follow naturally from my assumption that a target of 
predication, and hence a discourse referent, is (based on) a witness set of the generalized 
quantifier denoted by the given DP. The natural formalization of this idea is slightly different 
from K&R’s. K&R’s discourse referents are plain variables, and DP-intemal conditions are 
represented as predicated of them. I propose that the discourse referent a DP introduces is a 
variable that is ab ovo restricted (sorted) to range over (plural individuals formed from) witness 
sets o f  the corresponding generalized quantifier. E .g., the discourse referent introduced by two 
men is a variable over plural individuals made up of two men. (This differs from the usual 
notion o f  restricted quantification, which relies the (smallest) set the GQ lives on, i.e. its NP-set, 
rather than its witness.)
The behavior o f DPs that occur in HRefP and Focus (the latter the functional counterpart 
of S& B’s ShareP) is straightforwardly derivable from the properties K&R attribute to set denoter 
referents (singular or plural individuals, in present terms). What DRT gains from S&B, in turn, 
is an empirically more precise characterization of the working of distributivity, cf. the 
description of the silent each operator in S&B.
Let us assume, then, in general that the DRS construction algorithm does not take the 
simple phrase structures used in K&R as input but, rather, its operation is directly determined 
by the logical form S&B’s analysis assigns to the sentence. This will have clear advantages in 
connection with inverse scope, for instance. K&R comment on the fact that not all noun phrases 
can take inverse scope, but eventually they opt for the stipulation that a syntactically lower noun 
phrase may be processed before a syntactically higher one, which is equivalent to assuming QR. 
Just as S&B’s theory eliminates QR, it will make this overgenerating stipulation unnecessary and 
predict the correct orders in which noun phrases can be processed.
But there are reasons for more substantial modifications of DRT. These have to do with
13 Abstraction is an operation in K&R that intersects a DP’s restrictor NP with VP. 
Abstraction is the standard procedure that forms an antecedent for "maximal reference 
anaphora," as in Most of the boys left. They (=all the boys who left) were tired. In addition, 
K&R introduce such abstraction-based referents for cardinal quantifiers (cf. 17 in (41) and (43) 
below) even if no anaphora is involved. Their motivation for the latter move concerns the 
treatment of existential there and binominal each. They propose the generalization that DPs 
which introduce a referent that is free for binding by an existential quantifier or by each can 
occur in these contexts. But this cannot be quite correct: DPs like (more/fewer-) than 50% of the 
books occur in both contexts but are not cardinal (intersective) and hence, according to K&R’s 
general theory, cannot fall under the generalization (cf. Sutton 1993). Although this observation 
undermines K&R’s motivation, these abstraction-based referents for cardinals seem quite 
innocuous (precisely because they would be formed productively to support maximal reference 
anaphora anyway). So I will continue to use them, as K&R do.
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the behavior of DPs that occur in HDistP and PredOp. Justification for the suggestions in (38) 
and (39) will be offered below. What is relevant at this point is that construing DPs in HDistP 
as logical subjects of predication and DPs in PredOp as predicate operators is essentially to 
follow Ben-Shalom’s (1993) insight, cf. 2.1. DPs in HDistP now join the ranks o f discourse 
referent introducers. The result, I believe, amounts to adding a procedural flavor to DRT. On 
this view, DPs that introduce a discourse referent do not only differ from other DPs in 
quantificational force and in how they support anaphora. Their contributions to the interpretation 
of the sentence are calculated using different verification procedures.
This procedural intuition may be reminiscent of Brentano and Marty’s distinction between 
categorical versus thetic judgments, as revived in Kuroda (1972) and Ladusaw (1994). At present 
I am not in a position to judge how far a natural parallelism might go .14 On the other hand, the 
same procedural intuition may set apart my version of DRT from its DPL-style reincarnations.
To illustrate, the representations I will be arguing for are as follows.
The first example is much like in K&R. The differences are (i) that X is now understood 
as a variable over plural individuals, not sets, and (ii) X is a restricted (sorted) variable. I will 
use the following notational convention: XGDP is a variable ranging over plural individuals 
whose atoms are the elements o f some witness set o f [D P I . Note that K&R’s E operator 
(abstraction) forms the intersection of the sets of books and things read by x; this is a maximal 
set.
14 The parallel between the predicational mode and categorical judgments seems clear: " [T]he 
categorical judgment is assumed to consist of two separate acts, one the act of recognition o f that 
which is to be made the subject, and the other, the act o f affirming or denying what is expressed 
by the predicate about the subject" (Kuroda 1972:154). On the other hand, Kuroda’s and 
Ladusaw’s suggestion seems to be that thetic judgments are existential statements. This differs 
from my claim conceptually and also factually (counters include DPs with proportion- 
al/presuppositional determiners, which can at best occur in there-sentences with a coda).
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(40) [RefP Two boys! Lgrsr ti each read2 [ ^ p  exactly five books3 [VP tt t2 13]]]]
(41)
X G TWO-BOYS
Beghelli—Ben-Shalom-Szabolcsi (1995, Section 5) contains a further illustration of the crucial 
use of K&R’s assumptions.
The second example involves every boy that, according to my proposal, introduces a set 
referent. Notation: X G D P* is a variable ranging over witness sets of [ D P I .
(42)
(43)
[a^sp every boy3 read2 [DistP tx Dist [ ^ p exactly five books3 [VP t3 t2 13]]]]
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This replaces a "tripartite" structure in K&R.15
With these general considerations in mind, let us return to the justification o f (37) 
through (39).
'h Two types o f collective readings
First consider the contrast between collective interpretations supported by DPs in HRefP versus 
DPs in PredOp:
(44) a. Ez a hat fiú fel-emelte az asztalt. HRefP
’These six boys lifted up the table (together)’ 
b. Ez a hat birtok körül-öleli a kastélyt.
’These six estates surround the castle (together)’
(45) a. Több/kevesebb, mint hat fiú emelte fel az asztalt. PredOp
Tt took more/less than six boys to lift up the table (together)’ 
b. Több/kevesebb, mint hat birtok öleli körül a kastélyt.
’More/Less than six estates surround the castle (together)’
Following Kamp & Reyle (1993), I propose that in (44) the subject introduces a plural individual 
referent and ’lifted up the table’ is predicated of it collectively. More precisely, K&R treat bare 
indefinites as "set denoters," although they note that these sets are in one-to-one correspondence 
to plural individuals and that the plural individual view is in fact intuitively preferable. I am 
switching to plural individuals on the technical level, too, reserving the option o f having set 
referents for another kind of DP.
In K&R’s theory, collective predication is the only way to obtain a collective 
interpretation for the sentence, and in fact, they do not discuss convincing examples that would 
force one to think otherwise. But the examples in (45) are such. The subjects do not introduce
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a discourse referent either in a technical sense (see the anaphora facts below) or in an intuitive 
sense. The sentences in (45) are in no way "about" some boys or estates. Thus I claim that these 
sentences receive their collective interpretation in a different way. Namely, it is the predicate 
that denotes a group, as opposed to a set o f  individuals, and what the DP does is to count the 
atoms of this group. E.g.,
(46) ’The collective that surrounds the castle and consists o f estates has more/less than six 
atoms’ «
Thus I would say that the sentences in (45) have a collective interpretation but their subject DPs 
are not interpreted collectively.16 17
So, in line with K&R, I assume that DPs in HRefP/Focus denote plural individuals that 
can be subjects of collective or distributive predication, while DPs in PredOp are counters. In 
distinction to K&R, however, I assume that the latter can count either the elements of a set, or 
the atoms o f a group, whichever the predicate they operate on denotes. This takes care o f (44) 
versus (45).
Two types of discourse referents
In this section I discuss various aspects of (38), i.e. that DPs in HDistP introduce a set referent. 167
16 K&R propose an analysis for Most o f the men saw the same film / gathered (at the same 
place) that is similar to the above in that a set referent is constructed from the restrictor and the 
VP, but they note that this merely ensures that the film does not vary with the men; they do not 
need to see it together. They believe that the latter type of reading is not possible with most, but 
they conjecture that if for som e speakers it is, then they allow most N to introduce a set referent 
as a last resort. In other words, K&R do not consider the kind of data and analysis I do.
17 In English, some o f the counting quantifiers have a variant that introduces a plural 
individual. This is claimed in Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984) and corroborated by S. Spellmire 
(p.c.). Thus, w e have,
Some more/fewer than six men lifted the table [collectively].
These are comparable to few N  versus a few N . The suspicion may arise that the English 
counterparts o f  the Hungarian examples only work with these variants (with the determiner some 
"suppressed," perhaps). N otice, however, that Few estates surround this castle clearly differs 
in meaning from A few estates surround this castle, and yet, both sentences are impeccable. 
Thus the phenomenon cannot be reduced to the subject introducing a plural referent. — I should 
add that that corresponding Hungarian DPs in PredOp do not allow for the plural construal at 
all.
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8.1 No plural individual referent in HDistP
Let us turn to anaphora facts that establish whether a DP introduces a plural individual referent. 
In K&R, the most important mark of DPs that introduce a plural referent is that they can 
antecede a collective subject pronoun even when the latter is inside their own distributive 
predicate, see (47)-(49) below. Here is why this is the test case. In cross-sentential anaphora like 
Many boys came. They were curious the pronoun constructs an antecedent for itself using the 
restrictor ’boy’ and the predicate ’came.’ But a pronoun located inside a predicate cannot use 
that same predicate in constructing an antecedent for itself. It can only corefer with a previously 
introduced discourse referent. And since we want a collective interpretation for the pronoun, the 
discourse referent it corefers with must be a plural individual, too.
It turns out that the Hungarian data are even easier to judge than the English ones. In 
Hungarian, DPs that contain a numeral are themselves in the singular and, alongside with 
conjunctions of singulars, trigger singular agreement on the predicate:
(47) John és Bill 
Két ügyvéd 
Sok ügyvéd 
Hatnál több ügyvéd 
’John and Bili 
two lawyer 
many lawyer 
more than six lawyer
In cross-sentential anaphora all these DPs antecede plural pronouns. When however they c- 
command a (possibly non-overt) pronoun, a singular pronoun receives a bound individual 
variable reading, while a plural pronoun (preferably) receives a coreferential reading. Now 
consider Kamp & Reyle’s diagnostic context:
(48) John és Bill / két ügyvéd olyan titkárnőt vett fel, akivel előbb
’John and Bill / two lawyers hired a secretary that
If {3sg}, interview distributive; 
if{3p l> , interview can (must?) be collective.
(49) Minden / Sok ügyvéd olyan titkárnőt vett fel, akivel előbb elbeszélget-ett{3sg}
* elbeszélgettek{3pl}
elbeszélget-ett{3sg} 
elbeszélget-tek{3pl} 
he had interviewed 
they had interviewed’
titkárnőt vett fel / vett fel titkárnőt.
secretary-acc hired{3sg}’
24
’Every lawyer / many lawyers hired a secretary that had interviewed 
they had interviewed’
If {3sg}, interview distributive; 
if  {3pl}, *
(50) Hatnál kevesebb / Sok ügyvéd vett fel olyan titkárnőt, akivel előbb elbeszélgetett{3sg}
* e lb e sz é lg e t-te k {3 p l} .
’Less than six lawyers / many lawyers hired a secretary that he had interviewed
they had interviewed’
If {3sg}, interview distributive; 
if  {3p l}, *
The demarcation line lies exactly where K&R place it in English on the basis of judging 
the available interpretations. Only in the case of DPs that occur in HRefP/Focus does the plural 
pronoun corefer with "the DP itself." In the other two cases, the plural pronoun picks up D P’s 
smallest live-on set or a contextually given set as its antecedent. Naturally, the collective 
interview reading requires a plural pronoun subject.
8.2 Essential quantifiers and distributivitv
The fact that DPs in HDistP are never linked to a plural pronoun in this context might suggest 
that they are interpreted in essentially the same way as those in PredOp, namely, as generalized 
quantifiers. The difference would consist in the first type having distributivity built into their 
definition.
In fact, Partee (1995) observes (extending a claim in Gil (1989, 1995)) that all essentially 
quantificational DPs are distributive. Let me reinterpret "essentially quantificational" as those 
DPs whose determiner is not purely intersective and which cannot be taken to denote (atomic 
or plural) individuals, either. Every N and proportionals are essentially quantificational. 
Furthermore, non-individual denoting DPs whose restrictor is presupposed not to be empty are 
essentially quantificational, too. The reason is that a presupposition that pertains to only one 
argument of the determiner prevents the determiner from being symmetrical (and hence 
intersective).
It is possible to maintain that all DPs in HDistP are essentially quantificational. Recall 
what w e have here: ’every N ,’ ’many N ,’ ’at least/more than n N ’, and ’also, even’ phrases. 
Crucially, it is not counter-intuitive to say that when több, mint hat fiú ’more than five boys’ 
occurs in HDistP, we presuppose that there are boys. Maybe we are even thinking of boys 
drawn from a known superset o f individuals, that is, the phrase may even be specific in Enc’s
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(1991) sense.
In fact, Hungarian even offers further subtle confirmation of Partéé’s hypothesis. 
Consider the PredOp data discussed in (45), repeated here:
(51) a. Több/kevesebb, mint hat fiú emelte fel az asztalt. PredOp
’It took more/less than six boys to lift up the table (together)’ 
b. Több/kevesebb, mint hat birtok öleli körül a kastélyt.
’More/Less than six estates surround the castle (together)’
If több/kevesebb. mint hat N is replaced by az N-ek közül több/kevesebb. mint hat ’more/fewer 
than six among the N s,’ the collective readings disappear. Similarly, if  we have sok ’many’ or 
kevés ’few’ here and they are interpreted proportionally, the collective readings disappear. We 
may say that both changes result in essentially quantificational DPs.
8.3. Set referents in HDistP
It seems now that both the anaphora facts and the distributivity of phrases in HDistP would 
follow automatically if  we assumed that they receive an essentially quantificational, "tripartite" 
analysis. I submit, however, that there are other facts that receive a natural explanation if we 
assume that these DPs introduce a discourse referent o f some sort, and the same facts remain 
mysterious if  they are treated as quantificational.
The Hungarian data are critical in developing this argument. The reason is that the 
diagnostics I will use have to do with non-maximal reference anaphora and referential variation. 
In English, allegedly only universals reside in DistP. But a universal has a unique witness that 
is identical to its restrictor (smallest live-on) set, whence we cannot test whether it supports non- 
maximal reference anaphora or whether it exhibits variation. In Hungarian, however, DPs like 
’many men’ and ’more than five men’ also occur in the same HDistP position as ’every man,’ 
thus the relevant tests can be performed. Furthermore, since the same DPs occur in PredOp, 
too, minimal pairs can be formed to isolate the properties present only in HDistP. I assume that 
universals are to be analyzed analogously to other DPs in HDistP.
In accordance with their inability to antecede c-commanded plural pronouns, cf. (48)- 
(49), DPs in HDistP and PredOp are alike in that they do not normally support non-maximal 
reference anaphora. In the examples below, we are assuming that some new fans o f OT are 
phonologists, whence the subject of the second sentence cannot be anaphoric to the all the 
linguists who began to take an interest in OT last year. But anaphora to a subset o f them that 
contains just many syntacticians is apparently out in both (52) and (53). For perspicuity, I will 
star the English translations of the unacceptable Hungarian examples:
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(52) Tavaly is sok nyelvész elkezdett érdeklődni az optimalitás-elmélet iránt. ??Különféle 
szintaktikai problémákra próbálják alkalmazni.
’Last year, too, many linguists (HDistP) began to take an interest in Optimality theory. 
??They are trying to apply it to various syntactic problems’
(53) Tavaly is sok nyelvész kezdett el érdeklődni az optimalitás-elmélet iránt. *Különféle 
szintaktikai problémákra próbálják alkalmazni.
’Last yeai;, too, many linguists (PredOp) began to take an interest in Optimality theory. 
*They are trying to apply it to various syntactic problems’
On the other hand, consider the following contrast:
(54) a. Több, mint hat diákunk megbukott.
Rosszul tudod, végül átengedték őket.
’More than six students o f ours (HDistP) flunked.
You are wrong, in fact they passed’
b. Több, mint hat diákunk bukott meg.
* Rosszul tudod, végül átengedték őket.
’More than six students o f ours (PredOp) flunked.
* You are wrong, in fact they passed’
Here the standard "maximal set" of those students who flunked cannot be the antecedent of 
’they’ in the response. If it was, then the response in (54a) would be a contradiction (the 
students who flunked eventually passed), which it is not. Seeking a way out, one might think 
that the subject o f ’they passed’ refers to the set o f all those students who you thought flunked. 
But this would not distinguish between the HDistP and the PredOp cases, so this analysis is not 
correct.
I conclude that the DP in HDistP introduces a set that is salient enough for anaphora to 
build on when the standard maximal set is of no help. This set is a witness o f the generalized 
quantifier denoted by the DP .18 But a DP in PredOp crucially does not support this kind of 
anaphora, because it does not talk about individuals at all.
Next, consider the de re interpretations o f the complement subjects below:
18 We can control for the possibility that this set is in fact the antecedent’s restrictor (smallest 
live-on set) by changing the response from ’they passed’ to ’half of them passed.’ The relevant 
halves can easily be different, so it is transparent that we are indeed talking about (half of) the 
more than six students in question.
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(55) a. Legalább két kritikus úgy gondolja, hogy több, mint hat zseni megbolondult.
’At least two critics hold that more than six geniuses (HDistP) have gone crazy’
b. Legalább két kritikus úgy gondolja, hogy több, mint hat zseni bolondult meg.
’At least two critics hold that more than six geniuses (PredOp) have gone crazy’
Farkas (1995) argues that the descriptive content (DC) of any noun phrase may be evaluated with 
respect to the worlds introduced by superordinate clauses; in this case, this entails that whatever 
determiner the complement subject should have, the entities referred to may be geniuses in the 
speaker’s world, not in the critics’ worlds. This in fact does not follow from the present 
proposal and thus, if  correct, the mechanism Farkas proposes needs to be incorporated. On the 
other hand, there is a difference between the possible interpretations o f (55a,b) that goes beyond 
what the evaluation of the DC explains. Namely, (55a) can mean that there is a fixed set of more 
than six geniuses such that a fixed set of at least two critics hold that they have gone crazy. That 
is, on this reading the geniuses and the critics are chosen independently. In contradistinction to 
this, in (55b) it may at best be a coincidence if the critics hold about the same geniuses that they 
have gone crazy; there is no reading that guarantees it. This difference between (55a) and (55b) 
follows straightforwardly if we assume that the DP in HDistP introduces a referent correspond­
ing to a witness, but the DP in PredOp merely tells us how many geniuses each critic holds have 
gone crazy. As was mentioned above, K&R assume that discourse referents may be introduced 
into either the current DRS box or into any superordinate one; this squares with another proposal 
Farkas (1995) makes. (The reason why the critics do not vary with the members o f the witness 
in (55a) is that there is no distributive operator associated with this witness in the matrix clause.)
With these, I take it to be established that DPs in HDistP introduce discourse referents. 
But why, then, do they fail to support anaphora in (48) and (52)?
First, to account for (48), we may stipulate that coreference in the strict sense involves 
a relation between a pronoun and an expression denoting a singular or plural individual. Then 
one (natural) difference between bare indefinites like hat fiú ’six boys’ and inhabitants o f HDistP 
is that the referent the former introduces is an (atomic or plural) individual but the referent that 
the latter introduces is a set. As was noted above, such a distinction can be accommodated in 
K&R’s framework with a minimal modification.
This assumption is beneficial in explaining, in fact, why (according to S&B), bare 
indefinites do not move into [Spec, DistP] even when they are interpreted distributively and have 
to receive their distributive interpretation in a different way. We may stipulate that Dist selects 
for a set.
Second, to account for (52), we may stipulate that when plain coreference is not 
involved, maximal reference anaphora is preferred over anaphora to some other salient set. This 
assumption needs to be substantiated by further work.
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I wish to note here that my prime reason for pursuing the assumption that DPs in HDistP 
(and DistP) introduce a set referent does not lie in the facts discussed in this subsection. The 
prime reason has to do with the procedural intuition to which I turn below and with the 
consonant details o f  S&B’s analysis. Thus I take it that it suffices if  there are facts that point to 
the existence of such referents in classical DRT terms, even if  the proposed DRT treatment of 
these facts is just preliminary for the time being.
8.4 HDistP: Grab a witness and predicate distributivelv
Let us now see what the proposed analysis really is.
There is a sharp intuitive difference between Hungarian sentences that have HDistP or 
PredOp filled, even if there is no truth conditional difference. DPs that occur in both positions 
are especially instructive in this regard.
(56) Tegnap sok fiú meg-betegedett. HDistP
yesterday many boy pfx-sickened
’Many boys fell ill yesterday’ =  There is a set of many boys such that each fell ill 
yesterday
(57) Tegnap sok fiú betegedett meg. PredOp
yesterday many boy pfx-sickened
’The boys who fell ill yesterday were many’ =  The number of boys who fell ill 
yesterday is large
The first sentence is about a set o f  boys; the second is not. This difference seems quite sharp 
despite the fact that in both cases ’many’ may be proportional and/or we may be talking about 
boys that are drawn from a known set.
The analysis o f HDistP that I am advocating is a generalization of Ben-Shalom’s (1993) 
proposal for inverse scope and Chierchia’s (1993) proposal for pair-list readings, which is based 
on Groenendijk & Stokhof s (1984). As was reviewed above, Ben-Shalom assumes that inverse 
scope is effected by a binary quantifier whose working can be illustrated as follows:
(58) a. Three referees read every/two abstracts 
b. for every xE  A, three referees read x
where A is a witness set of the quantifier every/two abstracts
Chierchia assumes that pair-list readings are effected by a binary quantifier whose working can
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be for present purposes simplified as follows:19
(59) a. What did every/two boys read? 
b. for every x E A , what did x read
where A is a witness set of the quantifier every/two boys
That is, in both cases the quantifier that takes inverse scope or induces a pair-list reading is said 
to contribute a set to the interpretation of the sentence, associated with the distributive operation 
"every xE  A." These authors assume that this behavior of the quantifier is "unusual:" it obtains 
specifically in the inverse scope or pair-list context. My proposal differs from theirs in that I am 
assuming that offering up a witness to distributive predication is how quantifiers in HDistP 
always operate.
E .g., to illustrate with an English example, I am assuming that Every referee read three 
abstracts, on its direct S >  O reading is also calculated in the manner of (60b), rather than (60c); 
whether (60b) is thought to involve a binary quantifier is immaterial:
(60) a. Every referee read three abstracts
b. for every x E A , x read three abstracts
where A is a (=the) witness set of the quantifier every referee
c. every (referee) (read three abstracts)
It is worth emphasizing that the word "every" in (60b) stands for the distributive operator and 
in (60c) for the actual determiner. Thus the following Hungarian example makes the contrast 
more transparent, perhaps:
(61) a. Több, mint hat fiú el-ment. HDistP
more than six boy away went
b. for every x E A , x left
where A is a witness of ’more than six boys’
c. more-than-six(boy)(left)
Two observations that are crucial for this analysis are as follows:
(62) If Det is conservative and increasing,
19 Note that in Szabolcsi (1994a) I argue against using (59) as the general representation of 
pair-list readings, because it does not fit the full range of quantifiers that support pair-list; but 
here I appeal to (59) for an insight to be applied to a crucially restricted kind of examples.
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Det(N)(P) =  for some witness A of Det(N), for every xE  A, P(x).
(63) Only (conservative and) increasing quantifiers occur in HDistP.
(62) tells us that under certain circumstances the two ways o f construing the operation o f the 
quantifier are logically equivalent. (63) tells us that precisely these circumstances obtain in 
HDistP. This indicates that switching to the "grab a witness +  predicate distributive^" construal 
in HDistP yields .logically faithful interpretations.
Recall now the heuristic strategy formulated in (9) that has been used in most chapters 
of this book:
(64) What range of quantifiers actually participates in a given process is suggestive of exactly 
what that process consists in.
Since the "tripartite" construal would be generally applicable, i.e. would give truth-conditionally 
correct results for decreasing and non-monotonic quantifiers as well, it does not explain the 
restriction that only increasing ones occur in HDistP. This restriction suggests that HDistP is 
indeed charaterized by the alternative "predicative" mode o f operation.
Note in this connection that HDistP accommodates semelyik fiú ’none of the boys’ and 
Péter sem ’Peter either,’ which seem to contradict the increasingness claim. But Szabolcsi (1981) 
argued that semelyik fiú is just the negative concord form of minden fiú ’every boy;’ similar 
claims have been made about negative concord in Italian by Haegeman and Zanuttini (1990). 
Similarly, Péter sem is the negative concord form of Péter is ’Peter also.’ So these are not 
counterexamples. All genuinely decreasing quantifiers, as well as the non-monotonic ones, occur 
in PredOp.
8.5 Distributivitv and essential quantification, again
The distributive character o f HDistP phrases is now captured by the presence o f the distributive 
operator. This is an empirically weaker account than Partee’s would seem to be, in that it does 
not predict that essentially quantificational DPs outside HDistP are also distributive. But let us 
ask to what extent Partee can predict this. Partee (1995) in fact does not present the distributivity 
claim as a formal result, merely as a potential empirical generalization. The reason, I believe, 
is this.
If essentially quantificational DPs are all interpreted as "traditional" generalized 
quantifiers, then of course distributivity follows from the fact that Dets are relations between sets 
and the theory simply does not in any way cater to collective readings. We know, however, that
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collective readings exist, so an extension of the traditional theory is necessary and, as van der 
Does (1992) shows, possible. But suppose now that we can define a non-presuppositional, non­
proportional determiner kevés ’few’ that delivers "the number of the atoms of the collective that 
consists of Ns and VP-ed is small." There seems to be no inherent difficulty in defining a 
presuppositional and/or proportional version of this same determiner. Thus it may be an 
empirically correct decision to exclude these latter versions but, from a logical perspective, their 
exclusion is a stipulation.20
Note also that while essential quantifiers all seem to be distributive, not all distributive 
quantifiers are essentially quantificational. That is, not only do we have distributive readings for 
sentences with hat fiú ’six boys’ that denotes a plural individual, but distributive readings with 
purely cardinal sok fiú ’many boys’ and hatnál több fiú ’more than six boys’ in PredOp are also 
impeccable.
Finally, a legtöbb fiú ’most of the boys’ is an inherently proportional and an invariably 
distributive quantifier in Hungarian, but it resides in HRefP and not in HDistP.
In other words, while my proposal certainly does not bring all instances that fall under 
Partee’s generalization under the same heading, the deeper nature o f the entailment from 
presuppositionality / proportionality to distributivity is in fact an open question for the time 
being, and the relevant examples plainly cut across the positions HRefP, HDistP, and PredOp.
What remains to be accounted for on my analysis is the fact that these DPs are 
presuppositional. As Ben-Shalom (p.c.) points out, this may follow from the fact that if  there 
is no non-empty witness to serve as the subject of predication, predication will not be just false 
but would not even take place. In fact, on this view a DP like több, mint hat fiú in HDistP will 
presuppose the existence o f more than six boys, not just the existence o f boys, which I believe 
is correct.21
20 Naturally, further research may show that this effect derives from representation- 
al/procedural factors, like many considered in this paper.
21 We may observe in this connection that Diesing (1992) proposes to account for a 
somewhat similar intuition concerning the specific versus non-specific interpretations of bare and 
modified indefinites. Some of the crucial respects in which her proposal differs from the one 
developed here are as follows, (i) She assimilates specific (presuppositional) indefinites to 
restricted quantifiers and (ii) she assumes that non-specific indefinites always introduce variables 
captured by an existential closure operator.
Many of the observations motivating my analysis can be seen as reasons for rejecting 
Diesing’s. Ad (i), treating specific indefinites as quantificational prevents her theory from 
accounting for the data that motivate K&R to assume that these DPs introduce plural individual 
discourse referents. In fact, Diesing’s only empirical argument for the quantificational analysis 
comes from antecedent contained deletion. However, if  any bit of S&B’s theory o f LF is correct, 
then the fact that we observe some LF movement does not in itself allow us to diagnose that
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9*. The role of denotational semantic properties: important but limited
I argued above that one crucial fact that supports the "predicative" analysis is that all DPs that 
occur in HRefP/Focus or HDistP are monotonically increasing. All non-increasing DPs are 
confined to PredOp. Since only increasing DPs allow for a paraphrase like ’there exists a set or 
plural individual such that...’ without imposing a maximally condition, this is suggestive o f the 
fact that HRefP and HDistP are indeed positions for presenting discourse referents.
This shows that the denotational semantic properties o f a DP do determine, to some 
extent, in what ways it may operate. But do they determine it fully? Clearly not in the sense that 
one type of semantics implies a single type of operation, since e.g. the same proportional sok 
ember ’many people’ may occur in HRefP, HDistP and PredOp. But it turns out that 
denotational semantics cannot even predict fully the range o f options a DP actually takes.
The determiner ’more than six’ has two versions. The (a) version is analytic (syntactic 
comparison), the (b) version is synthetic (morphological comparison). Now, the former occurs 
either in HDistP or in PredOp, but the latter only in PredOp:
(65)a. Több, mint hat fiú ment el / el-ment. =  >  PredOp / HDistP
more than six boy went away / away-went
b. Hatnál több fiú ment el / ??el-ment. =  >  PredOp
six-than more boy went away / away-went
I see no independent semantic difference between the two versions, which indicates that the lack 
of ambiguity in the synthetic version is idiosyncratic.
Similarly, legalább hat fiú ’at least six boys’ does not, according to my own judgment, 
occur in PredOp, although logically equivalent ’more than five boys’ has a variant that does.
These observations may perhaps be revealing in connection with English, too. Working 
with English data one has the experience that while speakers tend to have both sharp and fairly 
uniform judgments concerning the scope behavior o f every N and few N . for instance, there is 
more hesitation and divergence in the case of, say, two N and more than six N . The Hungarian
movement as QR and the participating DP as a "quantifier." Ad (ii), the assumption that all non­
specific indefinites are variables captured by existential closure, irrespective o f whether they are 
monotonic increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic, gives logically incorrect results (see 
Barwise & Cooper 1981 and Chapter 1 for discussion). It may of course be possible to provide 
a pragmatic account of those data, as is suggested in Kadmon (1987). I believe, however, that 
such account would involve developing a major theory that shifts the borderline between 
semantics and pragmatics in a fundamental way. As no one to my knowledge has laid out such 
a theory, for the time being its benefits cannot be taken for granted.
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facts make this at least understandable. The former DPs are unambiguously "predicational" or 
"counters," whereas the latter may be either. Maybe English has both options for some QPs, 
too. Since English surface structure does not give a cue as to which we are dealing with, 
different speakers and/or different contexts may make one version more salient than the other.
Second, consider the fact that minden fiú ’every boy’ and a legtöbb fiú ’most o f the boys’ 
cannot appear in PredOp. At first blush it might seem that the reason is that they are restricted 
quantifiers. But this cannot be the correct generalization. As was pointed out in (39), the 
determiners o f DPs in PredOp need not be intersective. For one thing, kevés fiú ’few boys’ is 
always in PredOp, whether it is proportional or cardinal. Similarly, sok fiú ’many boys’ is free 
to have a proportional reading in PredOp. And finally, I pointed out in the discussion of (51) 
above that modified numerals in PredOp may be partitive, i.e. presuppositional, in which case 
they are not intersective, either.
The generalization I offered was that all the DPs PredOp accommodates are "counters." 
Minden fiú ’every boy’ is naturally excluded then. But why is a legtöbb fiú ’most o f the boys’ 
excluded? (It is confined to HRefP.) According to the standard analysis, it is equivalent to ’more 
than 50% of the boys,’ and a fiúknak több, mint 50 százaléka does occur in PredOp. One thing 
we might say here is that a legtöbb fiú is a counter, and it is just an idiosyncratic fact that it 
does not occur in PredOp (as is the case, although less sharply, with legalább hat fiú ’at least 
six boys’). Alternatively, we may say that a legtöbb fiú is not even a counter. In fact, this is 
exactly Sutton’s (1993) informal suggestion, who observes the following contrast in connection 
with binominal each:
(66) a.* The professors met most of the boys each.
b. The professors met more than fifty per cent of the boys each.
This contrast is paralleled by the following:
(67) a.* There will be most of the boys in the yard.
b. There will be more than fifty per cent of the boys *(in the yard).
It seems, then, that being a "counter" is also in part a representational/procedural notion.
11. Appendix on Hungarian
Two issues arise in connection with Hungarian that need to be briefly commented on, even 
though I am not developing a syntax o f the language here.
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(68) What positions do postverbal DPs occupy and what are their scope options?
(69) As was observed in (31), the table summarizing the distribution o f Hungarian DPs in the 
distinguished positions, a modified numeral must occur in PredOp unless (i) there is 
already another modified numeral in PredOp, or (ii) Focus is filled, or (iii) the verb is 
negated. Why?
Let us now begin with (68).
All literature on Hungarian agrees that postverbal DPs scope under preverbal ones (for 
the one exception, see fn. 5). What has never been seriously examined, to my knowledge, is 
what scopal options postverbal DPs have within their own domain. Given that the postverbal 
field is assumed to have a flat structure, É.Kiss’s general proposal makes either o f the following 
two predictions:
(70) a. If operators in Hungarian c-command their scope at S-structure (in terms of first
branching node c-command), then quantifiers in the postverbal field can be 
interpreted in either order.
b. If operators in Hungarian precede and c-command their scope at S-structure, then 
quantifiers in the postverbal field are interpreted in left-to-right order.
The reason why these predictions have not been scrutinized, I believe, is that having more than 
one scopal expression in the postverbal field is not usual and the judgments are rather difficult. 
(This is understandable: Hungarian goes out of its way to provide means to disambiguate scope; 
the postverbal field is not a usual domain for scope interaction.) But if we now look at the 
postverbal field with the moral o f  work on English in mind, we can construct critical data that 
are quite straightforward to judge. Such examples involve plural definites, universals, and 
modified numerals, especially decreasing ones. The choice of ’a Tuesday’ for Focus allows us 
to control for the possibility that a postverbal quantifier scopes out o f the postverbal field; if  the 
Tuesdays don’t vary, scope interaction is confined to the postverbal field.
(71) a. Egy keddi napon harapta meg hatnál több kutya Katit és Marit.
a Tuesday day-on bit pfx six-than more dog Kati-acc and Mari-acc 
Tt was on a Tuesday that more than six dogs bit Kati and Mari 
OK (a Tuesday > )  more than six dogs >  Kati and Mari’ 
ok (a Tuesday > )  Kati and Mari >  more than six dogs’
b. Egy keddi napon harapott meg hatnál több kutya minden fiút.
Tt was on a Tuesday that more than six dogs bit every boy
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ok (a Tuesday > )  more than six boys >  every boy’ 
ok (a Tuesday > )  every boy > more than six dogs’
c. Egy keddi napon harapott meg hatnál több kutya kevés fiút.
Tt was on a Tuesday that more than six dogs bit few boys 
ok (a Tuesday > )  more than six dogs >  few boys’
?? (a Tuesday > )  few boys >  more than six dogs’
d. Egy keddi napon harapott meg minden kutya kevés fiút.
Tt was on a Tuesday that every dog bit few boys
ok (a Tuesday > )  every dog > few boys’
* (a Tuesday > )  few boys > every dog’
What we find is essentially the same pattern as in English. ’Kati and Mari’ and ’every boy’ 
easily take inverse scope over a modified numeral. With great difficulty, ’few boys’ can take 
inverse scope over another modified numeral (H. Bartos, p.c.). But it is unthinkable for ’few 
boys’ to take inverse scope over a universal.22
These facts are inconsistent with both (73a) and (73b). What this means is that scopal 
order in Hungarian is not fully determined by S-structure. The inverse scopal orders must be due 
to LF movement.23
How can we account for the data? As an auxiliary assumption I postulate (following 
Brody 1989 and others) that the position of the finite verb is derived by fronting. V first moves 
to the head of the Aspectual Phrase (AspP) and merges with the overt prefix in Asp if  there is 
any. In aspectually simple cases and, more importantly, if  the sentence contains no Focus or 
PredOp, V stays there. If the sentence contains what I called Focus or PredOp, V moves on to 
the head of the next functional projection, leaving its prefix behind. For simplicity, I specify 
only that this head carries a [+ F ] feature and assume that Focus and PredOp are its alternative 
specifiers.24 V-movement to [+ F ] is comparable to Subject/Aux inversion in English.
With these in mind, I will assume that Hungarian has two "scopal fields," the visible
221 chose a subject-object word order to make the judgments simpler. It seems to me that 
the judgments are contingent merely on linear order, however.
23 Bartos (1995) argues that movement into the preverbal field in Hungarian supports an 
Earliness type approach to spelling out Phonetic Form, and the above LF data are also 
compatible with this within the framework of Brody (1994).
24 Or, there might in fact be two distinct functional projections here, one that hosts Focus 
and another that hosts PredOp; see also the discussion of (69). The choice is irrelavant here.
preverbal one and an invisible postverbal one which contains LF landing sites, as follows:
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(72) HRefP*
Spec HDistP*
Spec ' [ + F]P
Spec
[ + ]F AspP
Asp yX' ~~ RefP*
Spec ^  AgrXP
Spec ^  AgrYP
Spec DistP*
Spec VP
aka preverbal field aka postverbal field
The preverbal field is essentially as has been assumed in the foregoing discussion, with Focus 
and PredOp as specifiers o f  [+ F ]P , in complementary distribution. As regards (H)Dist, I assume 
that each (H)Dist head has an event quantifier as its share, albeit I do not assume SharePs all 
over the place. The linearly n +  1th event quantifier quantifies over subevents o f the linearly nth; 
the event variable resides in the VP.
On their way from VP to the preverbal field, DPs pass through their agreement positions 
to check Case fetaures. In addition, I assume that DPs move to FIRefP and HDistP successive 
cyclically. This movement utilizes the RefP and DistP positions in the postverbal field.25 In 
distinction to the above, DPs may move from their agreement positions to the specifier of [+F]P  
in one swoop.
Let us now turn to the postverbal field. The data reviewed suggest that in the postverbal 
field, Hungarian is much like English on S&B’s description. I.e. there is LF-movement to DistP 
and RefP by the appropriate DPs, and there is reconstruction into VP. I note the following minor 
differences:
(i) RefP and DistP flank not just AgrSP but all the agreement positions, generated in a 
random order. This is to account for the fact that the order of postverbal DPs is independent of 
grammatical function and the fact that the linearly first can always take scope over the linearly
25 There are various ways to execute this that I will not choose among, (i) DP first adjoins 
to the LF-relevant projection DistP and then hops to HDistP; similarly for RefP/HRefP. (ii) DP 
passes through DistP on its way to HDistP, but its intermediate trace, for some reason, does not 
prevent the subsequent LF-movement o f another DP into the same position, (iii) We need to 
assume (H)RefP and (H)DistP recursion anyway. So we may postulate extra LF-relevant 
positions that serve no other purpose than hosting the intermediate traces o f DPs moved to 
HDistP and HRefP. Considerations in Koizumi (1994) may be relevant here.
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second.
(ii) There is no designated position corresponding to ShareP, at least not one that DPs 
move into. Recall that in the foregoing discussion I assumed Focus to be merely a functional 
counterpart of ShareP, which means that it does host bare indefinites that scope below HDistP 
but is not designed for specifically this purpose. On the other hand, PredOp was the functional 
counterpart of both agreement and VP-intemal positions that host modified numerals in English. 
Since the Hungarian postverbal field has no [+F] head, it has no specifiers comparable to Focus 
or PredOp. The corresponding DPs are simply in their agreement positions at S-structure, and 
stay there or reconstruct into VP at LF.
When a DP is in the postverbal field at S-structure, it sits in its agreement position. If 
it is a universal (and, possibly, a DP like több, mint hat fiú ’more than six boys,’ although the 
data are somewhat too subtle to be sure), it will have passed through DistP, which is a 
semantically significant step now, exactly as in the case of universal subjects in English.
There are two kinds o f LF movement that may create postverbal inverse scope, by which 
I mean a scopal order that does not match linear order. One is the movement of an appropriate 
DP to RefP. The other is the reconstruction of any appropriate DP into VP. As in the discussion 
of S&B at the outset, I assume that only semantically insignificant movement can be undone by 
reconstruction. Thus a DP that has passed through RefP or DistP cannot be reconstructed. 
Essentially, all and only those DPs that are linked to PredOp by a parasitic chain can be 
reconstructed into VP.
These assumptions derive the data in (71) as follows. In (71a), the inverse reading is due 
to the movement of ’Kati and Mari’ into RefP. In (71b) and (71c), the inverse reading is due 
to the reconstruction of ’more than six dogs’ into VP; in the latter case the marginality o f this 
reading needs an independent account, as in English. In (7Id), the inverse reading is 
unquestionably out because ’every dog’ cannot reconstruct into VP.
With this general picture in mind, let us turn to (69), the question pertaning to the 
behavior of postverbal counting quantifiers.
Recall that PredOp is in complementary distribution with Focus before the finite verb 
stem. It differs from Focus in two ways. First, DPs in Focus, denoters of singular or plural 
individuals, are associated with exclusion-by-identification, while DPs in PredOp do not receive 
any "extra" interpretation. (See É.Kiss (1994) and Szabolcsi (1994b).) Second, DPs in Focus 
are negated directly, while DPs in PredOp are not:
(73) Mari ment el. — Nem Mari ment el.
Mari went away not Mari went away
’It is Mary who left’ ’It is not Mari who left’
(74) Kevés fiú ment el. — Nem ment el kevés fiú.
few  boy went away not went away few boys
’(There are) Few boys (who) left’ ’There aren’t few boys who left’
Given these differences (plus another reason, having to do with the behavior of csak ’only,’ 
discussed in Szabolcsi 1994b), it was convenient in the main text to distinguish Focus and 
PredOp. This paid off in view of the functional parallelism between S&B’s ShareP and Focus 
with bare indefinites on the one hand, and S&B’s AgrP/VP positions and PredOp on the other.
Nevertheless, the question in (69) remains. I adopt a suggestion by M.Brody (1989; 
p.c.). Whatever the exact relation between Focus and PredOp might be, they are specifiers of 
some head with a [+F] feature. (The head that has [+ F ] attracts the finite V .) The behavior of 
modified numerals, then, is exactly like that of wh-phrases in, say, English: they must check 
their [+ F ] feature overtly unless another item has checked its [+ F ] feature overtly. Modified 
numerals that remain postverbal are then analogous to wh-in-situ. Following Kayne (1983) and 
Longobardi (1991), Brody (1994) argues that wh-in-situ are linked to the [+wh] C by a 
secondary chain that is parasitic on the primary chain corresponding to overt movement. By 
analogy, postverbal modified numerals belong to a secondary chain linking them to the overt 
[+F]-checking position. This will make the correct prediction that a postverbal modified numeral 
does not take scope in PredOp; it takes scope in situ. This is confirmed by the fact that that 
another quantifier may scope between them. In (75), ’everyone’ unambiguously scopes over ’few 
jokes:’
(75) Mari / Hatnál több fiú mesélt mindenkinek kevés viccet.
Tt was Mary / There were more than six boys who told everybody few jokes’
Finally, we must ask why modified numerals are [+ F ]. A simple, perhaps also 
simplistic, answer might be this. The DPs that can introduce discourse referents and serve as 
targets o f  predication are actual or potential topics. The DPs that cannot introduce discourse 
referents are bound to be part of the comment. [+F] is perhaps nothing else than "is part of the 
comment."26
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26 This view is consonant with the bipartite <  grounding, claim >  representations in Kálmán 
(1994). Kálmán argues that a [+ F ] constituent is part of the claim and the remnant o f the 
grounding. I thank L. Kálmán and M. Brody for discussions on the feature [+ F ].
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